



President Labaj, Chief Justice White, Dean Frankino, ladies
and gentlemen, I wish particularly to say how pleased I am to be
on the dais tonight with Senator Hruska. Few men have played
a greater role in shaping the law of our time than has Senator
Hruska. In his capacity as ranking minority member of the Sen-
ate's Committee on the Judiciary he has taken a leading part in
shaping our laws and has screened those nominated as federal
judges and as Attorneys General and other posts in the Department
of Justice. He has been personally friendly and helpful to me and
I wish to express my gratitude and feeling of personal warmth to-
ward him tonight.
It is a great pleasure to participate in the dedication of the Ah-
manson Law Center of Creighton University. You have built a
magnificent facility. For me, for most of us, a center of legal schol-
arship is virtually hallowed ground because law is the ultimate
value in our society. Law is not ultimate because it is final, but
because upon it depend all of the other values we cherish.
The dedication of a new center of legal training and scholarship
gives us the sense of a new beginning, of the law's capacity to re-
generate and recreate itself.
Just being here and seeing your splendid facilities and meeting
Dean Frankino and the faculty makes me feel at home. I can
hardly wait to leave Washington and return to the academic world
--and not merely to enjoy what some genius has called the leisure
of the theory class.
It is the special province of the law schools to mount a sus-
tained study and evaluation of our legal culture. Now more than
ever our attention should be drawn to the condition of our legal or-
der and the institutions that sustain it. If at moments I sound
alarmist, I do not mean to sound pessimistic. There is always rea-
son for concern, never reason for despair.
0 Speech presented at Ahmanson Law Center Dedication dinner on
September 13, 1975.
** Solicitor General of the United States and Professor of Law at
Yale University; B.A., J.D., University of Chicago.
DEDICATION
Law is never secure. It is true that we rely upon law for our
security but also true that law relies upon us for its strength. We
tend to forget this. We tend to forget that our form of law is not
immortal. It is a social creation of enormous value and great
strength, but it is also complex, delicate, and distinctly vulnerable.
We live in a time-and perhaps we always do-when there are
serious threats to our legal order. But-and perhaps this is also
always true-we also live in a time when the real threats to con-
stitutional government are largely unperceived.
We are immeasurably blessed in this country with 'a cadre of
influential, articulate, and self-assured commentators who possess
the uncanny knack of studying any situation and unerringly draw-
ing precisely the wrong conclusions.
Since we survived the crisis of Watergate due to the strength
of our institutions, they conclude that our institutions must be re-
structured. I would commend to them the words of Mark Twain:
"We should be careful to get out of an experience only the wisdom
that is in it-and stop there; lest we be like the cat that sits down
on a hot stove-lid. She will never sit down on a hot stove-lid again
-that is well; but also she will never sit down on a cold one any
more."
Translated that means presidential power can be abused, as can
be and has been all power, but that is no reason to destroy strong
presidential leadership that has over almost two centuries proved
indispensable to our national health and vitality.
The real agenda for reform is more mundane but absolutely
crucial. Threats to our legal order are developing rapidly, but al-
most unnoticed-and these are older, subtler, and infinitely more
difficult to cope with.
The law schools, for example, are coming out of a very difficult
period. Their self-confidence was shaken badly by the student tur-
moil of the late 1960's 'and for some years afterward legal educators
seemed unsure of themselves and their roles.
The schools of law mold the future of our profession and hence
of much of our government. To one who believes that we owe our
national stability and good fortune to the solidity of our institu-
tions, it was disheartening to see that many of our law schools were
manned by faculties that displayed, and hence taught, an unlaw-
yerly concern for ideological outcomes rather than for orderly, neu-
tral processes. Being attached to universities, the law schools
shared to some extent the intellectual residue of the revolutionary
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'60's: an antipathy to intellectualism, a denial of the value of ra-
tionality, and a disdain for traditional institutions.
Ideologically, many of our major law schools were, and a few
of them still are, so far out of balance that the range of respectable
discourse was only a fraction of the spectrum in the society at large.
That is not good for the schools, for legal education, or for the de-
velopment of the law.
I am confident that Creighton was not among the law schools
of this sort, and I think I see signs that many schools are returning
to the thoughtful professionalism that was the special virtue of
American legal education. Robert Hutchins once said that the best
education !anywhere in American universities is to be found in our
schools of law. Some of us lost that virtue for a while but we are
ready to earn the complement once more.
But there is another problem in the law that I would particu-
larly like to discuss tonight. It is not preposterous, I hope, to begin
with what I have observed in the Office of the Solicitor General.
It is a small, specialized unit but in the matters I am discussing it
is a microcosm in which the larger problems of government and
something of their cuases may be discerned.
We are sitting in the center of an explosion of federal litigation.
A comparison of two years is illuminating. In the 1963 Term of the
Supreme Court, the office handled 910 filings in the Supreme Court.
Eleven years later, in the 1973 Term, we handled 2,428, or well over
two and one-half times as many.
A main problem of the office, then, is simply a staggering work-
load. The staff is enlarged but coordination of work and positions
to be taken inevitably suffer. This rising torrent of federal litiga-
tion might not be very worrisome if it damaged only the Solicitor
General's office but, in truth, it is only one manifestation of over-
load that threatens all of our major governmental institutions and
is even now altering their nature, perhaps irreversibly.
The reasons for the accelerationg workload are also suggested
by a statistic. The Solicitor General's cases in the 1963 Term com-
prised 33% of the Court's total docket. My cases in the 1973 Term
comprised 48% of the docket, and the percentage will rise again.
That means government litigation is rising not only absolutely but
as a proportion of all litigation.
The reasons are obvious. We, along with every other western
nation, are steadily transforming ourselves into a highly-regulated
welfare state. The tasks government undertakes grow steadily
more numerous and always more complex. Under this accelerating
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workload all of our basic governmental institutions are changing
and they will not be the same again.
The deleterious effects upon the Presidency are obvious. The
Presidency now in large measure exists in the enormous staff
known as the Executive Office of the President. The Executive Of-
fice includes such organizations -as the Office of Management and
Budget, the Council of Economic Advisers, the Domestic Council,
the National Security Council, and many more. Post-Watergate
critics of the Presidency note that anonymous, unelected, uncon-
firmed men and women make decisions crucial to the nation. That
is certainly true -and worth thinking about. But some analysts at-
tribute the White House apparatus to something they call the "im-
perial Presidency" and a growing lust for power. They would legis-
late the bureaucracy away.
That analysis could not be more inaccurate and the proposed
cure could not be more harmful. The presidential bureaucracy is
not a manifestation of a power drive but the inevitable response of
the Executive to the enormous tasks of regulation and coordination
that a welfare state thrusts upon him. To legislate away that staff
is merely to render the President helpless to control, or even sub-
stantially to affect, the policies of his own branch of government.
Had presidential staff grown because presidents have usurped
power, congressional staffs should have diminished or grown idle.
In fact, however, during the same period, congressional staff sizes
have exploded, and on those staffs, just as in the White House,
anonymous, unelected, unconfirmed men and women help make
decisions crucial to the nation.
These developments are ominous for the future of responsive
and open institutions of representative government. The institu-
tions of our democracy were designed in 1787 upon an assumption
of limited government and it may be that to function tolerably they
required a substantial measure of laissez faire in social as well as
economic policy.
As lawyers, however, we should be particularly concerned for
the federal judiciary which is equally threatened by this trend. The
proliferation of social policies through law creates a workload that
is even now changing the very nature of courts, converting them
from deliberative institutions to processing institutions, from a ju-
dicial model to a bureaucratic model. The signs are everywhere.
Caseloads rise steadily. Time for oral argument is steadily cut back
and is frequently eliminated altogether. Many cases are decided
without opinion. Some cases are decided in minutes rather than
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hours. Courts are adding more clerks, more administrative person-
nel, moving faster and faster. They are in imminent danger of los-
ing the quality of collegiality, losing time for conference, time for
deliberation, time for the slow maturation of principle.
Ironically, these changes that threaten the ability of the courts
to give every case its due spring precisely from the desire to extend
law to more and more subjects and to give every one perfect justice.
We are attempting to apply law and judicial processes to more
and more aspects of life in a self-defeating effort to guarantee every
minor right people think they ought ideally to possess. Simultan-
eously, we are complicating trial and pretrial procedures in what
must ultimately be an impossible effort to make every trial perfect.
The two trends, I think, are flatly imcompatible. We are seeking
to handcraft every case. At the same time we are thrusting a work-
load upon the courts that forces them towards as assembly line
model.
Assembly line processes cannot sustain those virtues for whch
we have always prized federal courts: scholarship, a generalist
view of the law, wisdom, mature and dispassionate reflection, and-
especially important for the perceived legitimacy of judicial author-
ity-careful and reasoned explanation of their decisions.
We cannot afford an erosion of these judicial virtues. As law
proliferates and is made up faster it has less time for theory and
tends to become both simplistic and inconsistent within itself. That
raises several dangers, not least of which is contempt for law. The
perception that despite its procedural guarantees, law may be sub-
stantively arbitrary, damages its moral authority, and law cannot
be effective unless it carries moral authority as well as the threat
of sanctions. Should any sizeable number of people come to feel
that the only reason to obey law is the possibility of unpleasantness
with the courts, the cost of maintaining social order with our pres-
ent degree of individual freedom will approach the prohibitive. We
cannot afford to dissipate any more of law's moral authority.
Something must -be done and done within the next several
years if we are to preserve the judicial system as we have known
it. The altered nature of the executive branch and the Congress
makes it more imperative that the judiciary be preserved.
The preferred solution would be to reverse the movement to-
ward ever more regulation. That may, in the long run, be the only
solution that can preserve our traditional legal order. Karl Mann-
heim noted a long time ago that the western concept of the rule of
law can survive only under conditions of limited government.
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But that is an issue beyond our immediate control. The legal
profession must pay attention now to the plight of the federal judi-
ciary. It is to the great credit of Senator Hruska that he has helped
focus discussion, heading a Commission that has proposed major re-
forms in our national appellate system. The problem of overload,
however, affects the entire system, from district court to Supreme
Court. The federal judicial system is being nickeled and dimed to
death by the immense quantity of legal trivia that a welfare state
generates.
One solution might be to take such matters out of Article III
courts. The social policies are important but the legal questions are
not difficult. Thus, in addition to considering the abandonment of
diversity jurisdiction, we ought to consider an entirely new set of
tribunals, analagous to small claims courts that would take over
completely litigation in a variety of areas such as Social Security
litigation, federal housing programs, consumer protection, truth in
lending, environment disputes, and so forth. Appeals from those
tribunals could be funneled into an administrative court and stop
there. Only the occasional serious constitutional claim or issue of
statutory interpretation need move from the administrative court
into an Article III court.
Senator Hruska and his Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System have made a notable start on one aspect
of the problem, but, as he would be the first to agree, much more
remains to be considered. It is a task that belongs to all branches
of the profession. I 'have recommended that the Department of
Justice take the lead in a study of the entire system and I hope
that it will.
But the Department cannot do it all. We look to the other
branches of the profession-the organized bar and the law schools-
to face with us this slow crisis in our legal system.
We ought not tinker with institutions lightly, for, as a wise con-
servative put it, "Unless it is necessary to change, it is necessary not
to change." But right now we are changing the federal court sys-
tem, and hence our legal order and our concept of the rule of law,
not in detail but in essential nature, and we are doing it not delib-
erately but through sheer inattention to the pressures that are
warping it.
Only by reducing their caseload can we preserve our courts to
handle the central problems of our society-the constitutional pro-
tection of individual liberties and of democratic processes of govern-
ment. These are precisely the values that will be increasingly
threatened in the regulatory-welfare state.
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We have lived through times of grave turmoil and division, but
we have learned again that our institutions were not built only for
-the easy, sunny days. They were built in the confident anticipation
of trouble, and they were ready when trouble came.
Of all the institutions that preserved us, none was more im-
portant than the federal judiciary. We must pay attention to the
federal courts. We must not take their virtues and strengths for
granted. We are facing an ever-deepening crisis but we can deal
with it as we have dealt with others. If we go forward toward re-
form, calmly, without either gimmicky tinkering or panicky overre-
action, in the light thrown by the highest traditions of the law,
there is no doubt whatever that our institutions will continue to pre-
vail over our troubles.
